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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Armando Garcia appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In 2009, Garcia entered a plea of guilty to trafficking in heroin pursuant to a Rule 
11 plea agreement in which he agreed to waive his right to appeal the case, including 
the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p.149; Resp. Ex. C, p.2.) The 
district court sentenced Garcia to thirty years with fifteen years fixed. (R., p.149.) 
Garcia filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied after a hearing. 
(Resp. Ex. G.) 
Garcia filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief and was appointed 
counsel to represent him. (R., pp.6-12, 24-28.) In his petition, Garcia claimed that his 
plea agreement was breached and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 
in several ways. (R., pp.6-12.) The state filed an answer (R., pp.29-34), and Garcia 
filed a Second Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief, alleging nine 
more ways his trial counsel was ineffective (R., pp.59-63). The State filed a Motion for 
Summary Dismissal and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal (R., 
pp.73-83), and Garcia filed a brief and a supplemental brief opposing the state's motion 
(R., pp.89-97,122-127). After oral argument (see generally 4/17/13 Tr.), the district 
court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order granting the state's motion for 
summary dismissal. (R., pp.149-159.) Garcia filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., 
pp.160-164.) This Court issued an order remanding the case to the district court for 
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Garcia states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed 
the petition for post-conviction relief, concerning breach of plea 
agreement[?] 
(Appellant's Brief, p.iii (capitalization and underscore modified).) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 




Garcia Has Failed To Establish Error In The District Court's Summary Dismissal Of His 
Post-Conviction Claims 
A. Introduction 
On appeal, Garcia contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately explain the terms of 
the Rule 11 plea agreement -- namely, that the state was free to recommend any fixed 
prison term it deemed appropriate. 1 (Appellant's Brief, pp.1-15.) Garcia also argues 
that the trial court erred by (1) not finding out, at the time of Garcia's plea, "just what it 
was that [he] did not agree with, and that [he] understood the ramifications of his guilty 
plea, and not just rolling with it, for some unknown reason" (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16), 
and (2) threatening him into pleading guilty by telling him that, if he did not accept the 
plea agreement, the original indictment would be refiled (id., pp.16-18). Lastly, Garcia 
appears to argue that his guilty plea should be invalidated because it was entered 
pursuant to I.C.R. 11 (f)(1 )(C),2 which requires the parties to agree on a "specific 
1 Garcia alleges his trial counsel tricked him into signing the Rule 11 plea agreement by 
not informing him about the true nature of such agreement. (Appellant's Brief, pp.2-13.) 
2 Idaho Criminal Rule 11 (f)(1 )(C) reads in relevant part: 
(1) In general. The prosecuting attorney and the attorney for the 
defendant or the defendant when acting prose may engage in discussions 
with a view toward reaching an agreement, which may include a waiver of 
the defendant's right to appeal the judgment and sentence of the court, 
that upon the entering of a plea of guilty to a charged offense or to a 
lesser or related offense, the prosecuting attorney will do any of the 
following: 
' '' (C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the 
case; 
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sentence," and his agreement permitted an open recommendation by the prosecutor in 
regard to the fixed portion of Garcia's sentence. (Id., pp.12-13.) 
A review of the record shows Garcia has failed to demonstrate any error in the 
district court's conclusion that he failed to meet his burden of establishing a genuine 
issue of material fact relative to any of his post-conviction claims that his trial counsel 
was ineffective. Additionally, Garcia failed to preserve his "trial court error" and "specific 
sentence" claims because he did not present them to the district court. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists 
which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted. Nellsch v. 
State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The Court freely reviews 
the district court's application of the law. ~ at 434, 835 P.2d at 669. However, the 
Court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Ferrier v. 
State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001). 
C. Applicable Legal Standards 
Idaho Code§ 19-4906(c) authorizes a district court to summarily dismiss a post-
conviction petition upon motion by a party if it appears there is "no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In order to 
survive summary dismissal, a post-conviction petitioner must present evidence in 
support of his petition sufficient to make "a prima facie case as to each essential 
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element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." Berg v. 
State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998). Furthermore, the factual showing 
in a post-conviction relief application must be in the form of evidence that would be 
admissible at an evidentiary hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 
546, 551 (1982); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 
1999). While a court must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court 
is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported 
by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 
Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 
P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). In other words, bare or conclusory allegations, 
unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary 
hearing. Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901; Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 
159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 826, 702 P.2d 
860, 864 (Ct. App. 1985). 
In the context of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has articulated the applicable standards as follows: 
For an application for post-conviction relief based on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel to survive a summary dismissal, the 
petitioner must establish that: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to 
whether counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) ·a material issue of 
fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced the applicant's case. 
To establish deficient assistance, the burden is on the petitioner to 
show that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. This objective standard embraces a strong presumption 
that trial counsel was competent and diligent. Thus, the claimant has the 
burden of showing that his attorney's performance fell below the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance. 
6 
To establish prejudice, the claimant must show a reasonable 
probability that but for his attorney's deficient performance the outcome of 
the proceeding would have been different. Trial counsel's strategic or 
tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those 
decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, 
or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. 
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-154, 177 P.3d 362, 367-368 (2008) (internal 
citations omitted). 
D. Garcia Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Summary Dismissal Of 
His Post-Conviction Claims 
Garcia's argument that the district court erred in granting the state's motion for 
summary dismissal is completely rebutted by the district court's "Memorandum Decision 
and Order" (R., pp.149-159), attached as Appendix A, which is incorporated into this 
Respondent's Brief and relied upon as if fully set forth herein. 
Garcia makes several arguments for the first time on appeal. First, he claims the 
district court erred by not finding out, at the time of Garcia's plea, "just what it was that 
[he] did not agree with, and that [he] understood the ramifications of his guilty plea, and 
not just rolling with it, for some unknown reason." (Appellant's Brief, p.p.15-16.) Next, 
Garcia contends the trial court threatened him into pleading guilty by telling him that if 
he did not accept the plea agreement, the original indictment would be refiled. (Id., 
pp.16-18.) Finally, Garcia alleges that because Rule 11(f)(1)(C) requires the parties to 
agree "that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case" (see 
Appellant's Brief, p.12), and his plea agreement did not involve a specific 
recommendation by the state, his guilty plea should be invalidated. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.12-15.) 
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Garcia did not present any of his "trial court error" or "specific sentence" 
arguments to the district court. (See R. pp.6-12, 59-63; see generally 4/17/13 Tr.) 
Therefore, this Court should not consider Garcia's arguments because he failed to 
preserve them. Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 
1998) ( declining to consider for first time on appeal claims not raised in post-conviction 
petition); State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992) ("The 
longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are presented for 
the first time on appeal."). This Court should affirm the district court's decision. 
In addition to the above, the state makes the following comments in regard to 
Garcia's Appellant's Brief. On pages 5 and 6 of his opening brief, Garcia quotes a 
segment of his trial counsel's testimony that was presented during the hearing on his 
motion to withdraw his Rule 11 guilty plea. 3 Immediately after the quote, Garcia asserts 
his trial counsel's explanation of what words he used to explain the plea agreement to 
Garcia "does not explain anything," and that "[e]verything else in [trial counsel's] 
statement in [sic] far to [sic] vague to make any sence [sic] out of." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.6.) However, Garcia omitted the subsequent and more pertinent testimony by his trial 
counsel, as follows: 
Q. [by prosecutor] And in that explanation, I've already heard you say 
that you told him or explained to him that the State, specifically myself, 
would be free to argue for fixed life; correct? 
A. Um-hmm. 
Q. Is that yes? 
A. Yes. 
3 Garcia incorrectly cites to page 40, lines 6 through 25, as where the quoted testimony 
is found. (Compare Appellant's Brief, p.5 with Resp. Ex. G, p.42, L.21 - p.43, L.22.) 
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Q. Okay. And did you also explain to Mr. Garcia that the ultimate 
sentence would be up to Judge Hansen? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you ever tell Mr. Garcia that he was guaranteed to be 
sentenced to ten years fixed, only? 
A. I never said that. 
Q. Did you ever give any words that would lead him to believe that, in 
your opinion? 
A. I did not. I made it perfectly clear to Armando that that's what I 
would be arguing for. And that's what I declared success, in terms of my 
personal benchmark that I set for myself in representing him. 
But I also knew that I don't get to make those important decisions 
with regards to the defendant and what a reasonable sentence is. That's 
the Court's responsibility. And that while I would be making a 
recommendation and you would be making a recommendation, the final 
arbiter of what the sentence would be, would be, in fact, the Court. 
Q. And you explained that to Mr. Garcia? 
A. I believe I did that in great detail. 
Q. Sir, I'm also looking at the Rule 11 plea agreement. 
And I'm wondering if you went over this plea agreement with Mr. 
Garcia, as well? 
A. I did. 
Q. And you did that before he signed the Rule 11? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And before he entered his guilty plea? 
A. Yes. 
(Resp. Ex. G, p.43, L.23 - p.46, L.1.) Contrary to Garcia's assertion that his trial 
counsel's testimony did not explain anything and was vague, the record reflects that 
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counsel clearly testified (a) he told Garcia the state was free to argue for a fixed term of 
up to life, (b) he explained to Garcia in great detail that the trial judge was the final 
arbiter of his sentence, (c) he never told Garcia he was guaranteed a sentence of ten 
years fixed, and (d) he explained the Rule 11 plea agreement to Garcia before Garcia 
signed it and entered his plea. 
Next, Garcia states his defense counsel "testified that he 'BATED' Garcia into 
taking the plea agreement, (M.W.P., P.48, Li. 10-12,) ... but how did he bate Garcia, 
thats [sic] the question." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Page 48 of the transcript of the 
hearing on Garcia's motion to withdraw his guilty plea does not contain the words bait or 
baited, nor does it indicate any conduct that suggests such conduct. The only time the 
word "bait" was used in trial counsel's testimony was when he explained his wariness 
that the prosecutor might have offered to amend the charge in order to bait Garcia into 
pleading guilty -- knowing that she was going to recommend a fixed term of more than 
ten years. (See Resp. Ex. G, p.52, Ls.13-23.) In short, Garcia's trial counsel never 
testified that he baited Garcia into accepting the plea agreement. 
Based on the district court's "Memorandum Decision and Order" (Appendix A), 
and the above supplemental arguments, Garcia has failed to show any error in the 
district court's summary dismissal of his post-conviction claims. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's summary 
dismissal of Garcia's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 4th day of August, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of August, 2014, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
ARMANDO GARCIA 
#29287 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CVPC 1024962 
MEMORA1\1DUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On September I 4, 2009, Petitioner Armando Garcia entered a plea of guilty to the felony 
offense of Trafficking in Heroin, LC. § 37-2732B(a)(6), in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2008-
0000062. Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate term of thirty years with fifteen years fixed. 
On December 20, 2010, Petitioner filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief. 
The State filed an Answer on February 23, 2011, along with a Motion for Production of Transcripts 
and for an Order Taking Judicial Notice of the Record in Case No. CR-FE-2008-0000062. An Order 
for Production of Transcripts and Order Taking Judicial Notice of the Record in Case No. CR-FE-
2008-0000062 entered on May 16, 2011. Pursuant to a Motion to Extend Time filed by Petitioner on 
May 6, 2011, the Court entered an Order to Extend Time on May 16, 2011. On August 29, 2011, 
Petitioner filed a Motion to Unseal Pre-Sentence Report, which was granted pursuant to an Order to 
Unseal Pre-Sentence Report Pursuant to ICR 32 entered on January 23, 2012. 
On October 17, 2011, Petitioner filed a Second Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief. Pursuant to a stipulation filed on February 10, 2012, the Court entered an Order 
Extending Time for State to File Motion for Summary Dismissal on February 23, 2012. On March 
5, 2012, the State filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal and Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Dismissal, along with a Supplemental Motion for Production of Transcripts and for an 
Order Taking Judicial Notice of the Record in Case No. CR-FE-2008-0000062. Petitioner's Brief in 




























Opposition to the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal was filed on May 17, 2012. An Order for 
Grand Jury Transcript entered on August 14, 2012. 
Hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal was scheduled for November 9, 2012. 
However, the matter was rescheduled due to the need to further supplement the record. Petitioner 
filed a Motion for Hearing Transcripts at County Expense on November 16, 2012, and an Order for 
Hearing Transcripts at County Expense was entered on November 26, 2012. Respondent's 
Supplemental Notice of & Request for Judicial Notice Pursuant to IRE 201(c) was filed by the State 
on December 31, 2012. An Order Taking Judicial Notice Pursuant to I.R.E. 201(c) entered on 
January 7, 2013. 
On February 1, 2013, Petitioner filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to the 
State's Motion for Summary Dismissal. The matter was set for hearing on March 4, 2013, but was 
again rescheduled due to the need for further supplementation of the record. Petitioner filed a 
Motion for Judicial Notice Pursuant to IRE 201(c) on March 8, 2013. At a hearing on March 20, 
2013, the Court overruled the State's objection to Petitioner's motion for judicial notice and 
indicated that it would consider the relevant portions of the documents at issue in connection with 
Petitioner's post-conviction application. 
Hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal was held on April 17, 2013, at which 
time the Court took the matter under advisement. 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act 
(UPCPA) is civil in nature. Accordingly, the applicant must "prove by a preponderance of evidence 
the allegations upon which the application for post-conviction relief is based." Charboneau v. State, 
144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007), citing Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 995 P.2d 794 
(2000). Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief "is appropriate if the applicant's 
evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903, 174 P.3d at 873, 
citing I.C. § l 9-4906(b), (c). In reviewing the application, 
[a] court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but need 
not accept the petitioner's conclusions. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 
110, 112 (2001). When the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the applicant 
to relief, the trial court may dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary 
hearing. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990), citing 
Cc,oper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). Allegations 




























contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are 
clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief 
as a matter of law. Id 
Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903, 174 P.3d at 873. 
The right to counsel in criminal actions is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. The Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act "provides an appropriate mechanism for considering claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel." Parrott v. State, 117 Idaho 272, 274, 787 P.2d 258, 260 (1990). To prevail on a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner "must demonstrate not only that his counsel's 
performance was deficient, but that the deficient performance so prejudiced his defense as to deprive 
him of a fair trial." Id. at 275, 787 P.2d at 261 (citations omitted). To establish deficient 
performance, a petitioner must show that his "counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness." Id., quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). To 
demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show that ''there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different" Parrott, 
I 17 Idaho at 275, 787 P.2d at 261, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability 
"does not mean 'more likely than not'; it means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome." Esquivel v. State, 149 Idaho 255, 258, 233 P.3d 186, 189 (Ct. App. 2010), citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. "Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do 
not make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel." Cooke v. State, 149 Idaho 233, 
246,233 P.3d 164, 177 (Ct. App. 2010), citing Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903. 
DISCUSSION 
In his Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief, and Second Affidavit in Support of 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief, Petitioner sets forth two grounds for relief: Breach of plea 
agreement and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court ·will address each of the claims 
separately. 
Breach of plea agreement 
In his Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief, Petitioner alleges "Breach of Plea 
Agreement" as a ground on which he bases his application. See Petition for Post Conviction Relief 



























at 2. Neither the petition and affidavit, nor the Second Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief, sets forth any details regarding how the State allegedly breached its plea 
agreement with Petitioner. Rather, those documents deal only with bases for Petitioner's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. However, attached as an exhibit to Petitioner's Motion for Judicial 
Notice Pursuant to IRE 201(c) that was filed on March 8, 2013, is a copy of the Supplement to I.C.R. 
35 Motion for Reduction of Sentence and Memorandum in Support (hereinafter Supplement to 
I.C.R. 35 Motion) that had been filed by Petitioner on April 23, 2010, in Case Nos. CR-FE-2008-
0000062 and CR-FE-2008-0017452. 1 In that supplement, Petitioner stated that his ''total 
understanding of his plea bargain was that he was guaranteed (10) years :fixed, with (20) years 
indeterminate." See Supplement to I.C.R. 35 Motion at 9. 
A defendant is "constitutionally entitled to relief when the State breaches a promise made to 
him in return for a plea of guilty, because when the prosecution breaches its promise, the defendant 
pleads guilty on a false premise." Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 882, 187 P.3d 1253, 1257 
(Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted). See also Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 595, 861 P.2d 1253, 
1260 (Ct. App. 1993) ( citation omitted), and Garzee v. State, 126 Idaho 3 96, 400, 883 P .2d 1088, 
1092 (Ct. App. 1994), citing State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 915, 693 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Ct. App. 
1985) (a breach of the plea agreement by the state affects the voluntariness of a guilty plea). For the 
following reasons, however, the Court concludes that Petitioner's assertion that the State breached 
its plea agreement in his case is disproven by the record. 
The State has submitted a copy of the written Rule 11 Plea Agreement Pursuant to I.C.R. 
ll(f)(l)(C) that was entered into between the State and Petitioner in Case No. CR-FE-2008-
0000062. That agreement states, in pertinent part: 
The terms are as follows: 
1. The mandatory minimum fixed sentence will decrease from fifteen (15) years fixed, to 
ten (10) years fixed; 
2. The parties are open to argue the terms of the Defendant's sentence, meaning the 
defense may argue the court simply impose the mandatory minimum sentence of ten 
(10) years, and the state may argue the court impose up to a maximum of life in prison 
as a :fixed sentence; 
Respondent's Exhibit C at 1 (emphasis added). That written plea agreement was signed by 
Petitioner on September 14, 2009. See Respondent's Exhibit Cat 2. At Petitioner's change of plea 
1 The Court notes that Petitioner was sentenced on both cases together. However, his application for post-conviction 
2 6 relief in this matter was filed in connection with Case No. CRFE 2008-0000062. 





























hearing on September 14, 2009, the Court placed the terms of that plea agreement on the record as 
follows: 
In this case, my understanding then is that Mr. Garcia would plead guilty to that 
amended information [in Case No. CR-FE-2008-0000062] and would also plead guilty 
to the indictment in case number CR-FE-08-17452. 
In exchange for those guilty pleas in those two cases, the State is free to argue any 
sentence up to the maximum which, again, is up to life in prison for either charge. 
The defense is free to argue that the Court simply impose the mandatory minimum in 
each case, which in the 062 case is 10 years in the State penitentiary and in the 17452 
case, it is three years in the State penitentiary. The State has agreed in its written Rule 
11 agreement to recommend that those sentences run concurrently, one ·with the other. 
Respondent's Exhibit F at 4 ( emphasis added). After placing the other terms of the plea agreement 
on the record, the Court then inquired, "And in this case, Mr. Garcia, was that your understanding of 
the agreement?" Respondent's Exhibit F at 5-6. Petitioner responded, "It is, Your Honor." 
Respondent's Exhibit Fat 6. After questioning Petitioner as to whether he understood the minimum 
and maximum penalties for the charges against him, the Court stated, "Now, sir, in this case do you 
understand that I am not bound by the agreement in terms of sentencing. In other words, there has 
been no sentencing agreement in this case and, therefore, I could impose any sentence up to the 
maximum. Do you understand that, sir?" Respondent's Exhibit F at 17 (emphasis added). 
Petitioner replied, "Yes, sir, I do." Respondent's Exhibit Fat 17. 
The record demonstrates that the State did not agree to make any particular sentencing 
recommendation with regard to fixed and indeterminate terms in Petitioner's case, and the record 
also contradicts Petitioner's assertion that his understanding of the plea agreement was that he was 
guaranteed ten years fixed, with twenty years indeterminate. In an application for post-conviction 
relief based upon a claim that the State breached its plea agreement, where the record "shows that 
the State did not breach the plea agreement, and where essential elements of a post-conviction 
petitioner's claim are conclusively disproven by the record in the underlying criminal proceedings, 
summary dismissal is appropriate. Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 882-83, 187 P.3d at 1257-58 (citations 
omitted). Accordingly, the Court concludes that summary dismissal of this claim is appropriate. 




























Ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
In his first ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner alleges that his attorney "Lied to 
me about the plea agreement, got me to plead under false pretenses and manipulation." Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief at 3. Petitioner has provided no information, contained in an affidavit or 
otherwise, to explain or support this allegation. Neither the Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-
Conviction Petition nor Petitioner's Second Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief contain any statements referencing or supporting this claim. The State has provided an 
affidavit of John DeFranco, who represented Petitioner at his change of plea hearing. Mr. Defranco 
states that he "explained in great detail the ramifications of the plea agreement in the above-entitled 
case; specifically, the fact that the State was free to argue for a fixed sentence of more than ten 
years." See Motion for Summary Dismissal and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Dismissal, Exhibit A at 1. As noted above, the Court set forth the terms of the plea agreement on the 
record and inquired as to Petitioner's understanding of those terms, and such terms were also 
contained in a writing signed by Petitioner. During his change of plea hearing, Petitioner indicated 
that he could read, write and understand the English language. See Respondent's Exhibit F at 6. 
After the Court set forth the details of the plea agreement, including the fact that there was no 
agreement as to sentencing, and ensured that Petitioner understood the minimum and maximum 
penalties for the charges against him, the Court then inquired as follows: 
THE COURT: Mr. Garcia, I do have some questions for you. As I indicated, it is my 
understanding you wish to plead guilty pursuant to [a] written Rule 11 plea agreement in 
these two cases to the two charges of trafficking in heroin. Is that correct, sir? 
THE DEFENDANT: That is correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: In this case, sir, have you discussed this matter fully with Mr. Defranco? 
THE DEFENDANT: I have. 
THE COURT: Do you feel you are fully aware of the consequences of entering the guilty 
plea to these two charges today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am aware. 
Respondent's. .l!Xffibit F at 11-12. As noted, Petitioner has not explained or demonstrated how 
Mr. Defranco allegedly lied to Petitioner with regard to the plea agreement. However, to the extent 




























that Petitioner's claim is based upon an assertion that he understood the terms of the plea agreement 
to be different than what they were, that claim is unsupported by any evidence provided by 
Petitioner, and is contradicted by Petitioner's own statements at the change of plea hearing, as well 
as by the written plea agreement which was signed by Petitioner. Allegations contained in an 
application for post-conviction relief are insufficient for the granting of relief when they are 
disproved by the record. See Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903, 174 P.3d at 873. Further, bare 
assertions, "unsupported by specific facts, do not make out a prima facie case for ineffective 
assistance of counsel." See Cooke, 149 Idaho at 246,233 P.3d at 177, citing Roman, 125 Idaho at 
649, 873 P.2d at 903. For these reasons, the Court concludes that summary dismissal is appropriate 
as to this claim. 
In his next ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner asserts that his attorney "failed 
to file a Notice of Appeal after I requested he do so after the Rule 11 Breach." Affidavit of Facts in 
Support of Post-Conviction Petition at 1. The Court notes that Petitioner's attorney could not have 
filed an appeal in Petitioner's case, as the written plea agreement specifically provided that 
Petitioner waived his right to appeal, as follows: 
The Defendant agrees to waive his right to appeal the case, this waiver includes, but is 
not limited to, the adverse ruling on Defendant's motion to suppress evidence, as well 
as abuse of discretion regarding sentencing. 
Respondent's Exhibit C at 2. Again, this written plea agreement was signed by Petitioner. The 
Court also placed that portion of the plea agreement on the record and examined Petitioner as 
follows: 
Q. Okay. In this case, then, sir, you also understand I am going to go over this in 
some detail because you are giving up a significant number of rights pursuant to this 
agreement. 
You also understand, sir, in this case you have given up your right to appeal 
any decision I have made in this case other than the denial of your motion to dismiss 
for vindictive prosecution. Do you understand that? 
A. I do understand that, Your Honor. 
Q. In other words, you cannot appeal, you will not be able to appeal my denial of your 
suppression motion, my granting of the State's joinder motion in this case. None of 
those things can be appealed by you. Do you understand that? 
A. I understand. 






























Q. In this case, if I do follow the agreement, in other words, if I do run these sentence 
concurrently but if I impose a sentence up to and including life, in this case, you would 
not be able to appeal that decision to the Idaho Supreme Court for abuse of discretion. 
Do you understand that, as well? 
A. I do. 
Respondent's Exhibit Fat 19. 
Absent a breach of a plea agreement by the State, a defendant's "waiver of the right to appeal 
as a term of a plea bargain is generally valid and enforceable." State v. Allen, 143 Idaho 267, 270, 
141 PJd 1136, 1139 (Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted). As Petitioner waived his right to appeal 
pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice as required by 
Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,688 (1984), caused by his attorney's failure to file such an 
appeal. For these reasons, the Court concludes that summary dismissal is appropriate as to 
Petitioner's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his attorney's failure to file a 
notice of appeal. 
In his next claim, Petitioner alleges that his attorney "Failed to argue 5th Amend. violation, 
coercion to make statement, No notification of Marenda (sic), and waiver." Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief at 3. However, this claim is contradicted by the record, as it is clear that such 
issues were the subject of the motion to suppress Mr. DeFranco argued on Petitioner's behalf in the 
underlying case. See generally Respondent's Exhibit E. Again, allegations contained in an 
application for post-conviction relief are insufficient for the granting of relief when they are 
disproved by the record. See Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903, 174 P.3d at 873. For these reasons, the 
Court concludes that summary dismissal is appropriate as to this claim. 
Petitioner also alleges, "Detective C. Cbristansen coerced my statement with indirect threats 
of arrest of my sister in law, and threatened me with years of imprisonment if I did not cooperate, 
and my attorney cooperated and participated." Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction 
Petition at 1. Petitioner has not directed the Court to any evidence in the record that supports the 
bare allegation that his attorney cooperated and participated in an alleged coerced statement. "Bare 
assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make out a prima facie case for 
ineffective assistance of counsel." Cooke, 149 Idaho at 246, 233 P.3d at 177, citing Roman, 125 
Ida.ho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903. Accordingly, summary dismissal is appropriate as to this claim. 




























The remainder of Petitioner's claims relate to allegations that Petitioner's attorney failed to 
investigate or adequately investigate certain matters. Those claims are as follows: 
1. My Attorney did not thoroughly investigate the Confidential Informant's agreement 
w/DEA. 
2. My Attorney failed to adequately investigate the warrantless search & seizure & did not 
adequately investigate possible suppression issues in the warrantless search & seizure. 
3. My attorney did not investigate the fact that the Confidential Informant may have 
tampered with the evidence & the chain of custody may have been affected. 
4. My attorney did not investigate whether there was adequate probable cause for the 
traffic stop. 
5. My attorney did not investigate whether or not surveillance footage of the parking lot 
where the stop occurred may have revealed suppression issues. 
6. My attorney did not adequately investigate whether or not Det. Christensen exerted 
undue influence & pressure on me during my interrogation. 
7. My attorney did not adequately investigate whether or not I was coerced into taking the 
trip to Salt Lake City & the controlled buy. 
8. My attorney did not investigate the fact that I had numerous discussions w/law 
enforcement w/out my attorney present after I had requested counsel. 
9. My attorney didn't adequately investigate whether or not law enforcement followed 
proper procedures for collection of evidence. 
Second Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief, Exhibit A at 111-9. However, 
Petitioner has not provided any evidence or information regarding what, if anything, a more 
thorough investigation of the above matters would have revealed. The Idaho Court of Appeals has 
noted that without such information, an applicant for post-conviction relief cannot demonstrate the 
prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim: 
Bare assertions that discovery was not properly conducted or that all avenues of 
investigation were not exhausted will not, by themselves, give rise to a right to relief. 
An applicant must provide at least some indication of what information is missing or 
how it would have been used in the defense. Without such a showing, there can be no 
evidence of prejudice and a claim is subject to summary dismissal. 
Jones v. State, 125 Idaho 294, 297, 870 P.2d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 1994). As Petitioner's bare assertions 
and speculation regarding his attorney's alleged failure to conduct an adequate investigation does not 



























make out a prima facie case for Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, summary 
dismissal is appropriate as to such claims. See Cooke, 149 Idaho at 246, 233 P.3d at 177, citing 
Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P .2d at 903. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is the Court's conclusion, pursuant to LC § 19-4906(c), that the 
State's Motion for Summary Dismissal should be granted. The State is hereby directed to prepare a 
fonn of judgment consistent with this decision. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this /JI,. day of June, 2013. 
TIMOTHY HANSEN 
District Judge 
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